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AI Safety Montréal
Reading group

AI Governance Reading Group

Each month, one AI governance paper. Bilingual. At Ω Labs or online. Follow on Luma →

  1. September 15, 2026, 6 PM

    The Closing Window: How Governments Could Lose Their Ability to Restrain Advanced AI

    Peter Barnett, 2026

    As AI capabilities advance, AI systems will pose greater risks to national security and potentially humanity as a whole. Governments may eventually conclude that these risks warrant restraining AI development. This motivates the question: will governments still be able to restrain AI development in the future, should they want to do so? In this paper we analyze which world events and changes to the state of AI development would make future governance more difficult or even effectively impossible. Our analysis surfaces likely pathways that would lead to these difficulties, including hardware proliferation, continued algorithmic progress, and the release of catastrophically dangerous AI models. Due to the field’s lack of understanding of AI development, it may be difficult or impossible to know when we will hit a “point of no return”, and we therefore recommend a conservative approach. The window may be closing, but governments currently have an opportunity to preserve their optionality if they act soon. Our policy recommendations would enable governments to restrain AI development in the future, while imposing relatively small costs today.

  2. August 27, 2026, 6 PM

    What AI evaluations for preventing catastrophic risks can and cannot do

    Peter Barnett, Lisa Thiergart, 2024

    AI evaluations are an important component of the AI governance toolkit, underlying current approaches to safety cases for preventing catastrophic risks. Our paper examines what these evaluations can and cannot tell us. Evaluations can establish lower bounds on AI capabilities and assess certain misuse risks given sufficient effort from evaluators. Unfortunately, evaluations face fundamental limitations that cannot be overcome within the current paradigm. These include an inability to establish upper bounds on capabilities, reliably forecast future model capabilities, or robustly assess risks from autonomous AI systems. This means that while evaluations are valuable tools, we should not rely on them as our main way of ensuring AI systems are safe. We conclude with recommendations for incremental improvements to frontier AI safety, while acknowledging these fundamental limitations remain unsolved.